Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER — PROUDHON

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"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."
JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

Richar[d] Feeney, a newsdealer of Ballston Spa, N. Y., and an old friend and supporter of Liberty, has started a weekly trade paper under the name of the "Eastern Newsdealer," in nearly every issue of which he has one or more editorial article forcibly driving home the lesson of liberty in matters concerning the news trade. It is good work.

With the increasing tendency to legislate in behalf of special interests the manifestations of the boomerang in politics become more and more frequent. Less than a year ago the supreme court was sacred in all capitalistic eyes. By a vote of five to four it had declared the income tax unconstitutional, and thus had become the bulwark of private property. To hint that its decisions were not immutable and abiding was treason and sacrilege. Largely on this issue a political campaign was waged for months, ending in triumph for the court and rout for the forces of disorder. Now all this is suddenly changed. By another vote of five to four this same court has decided that all combinations in restraint of trade are illegal. Property is tottering under the pressure of its own bulwark. By a wholesale denial of freedom of contract the sacred court has dealt capital a boomerang blow. The forces of disorder are rallying and cheering, and the organs of the plutocrats are filled with rage. The "Evening Post" forgets consistency, and hurls blasphemies at the sacred temple of justice. The "Sun," last summer and fall vituperatively pious, now impiously advises the railroads to achieve their ends by secret agreement, and thus violate the law. Other newspapers, less brazenly forgetful of their past, strive to suppress their feelings, sulking and muttering behind a thin veil of respect. The opponents of the trusts are tearing their throats with cries of joy. But have a care there! The boomerang again! What's this that the four say in answer to the five? If all combinations in restraint of trade are illegal, than trades unions are illegal! Looks reasonable, doesn't it? But how unexpected! To think that, after discoloring capital's eye, the boomerang should now fly at labor thus viciously! 'T was ever thus. But the combatants never learn, even from the example of the Anarchist. He is the only fighter in the political battle-field who doesn't use the boomerang. Yet him alone, strange to say, does the boomerang faithfully serve.

A good method of propaganda is to mark a newspaper article and mail the paper, with the words "Marked Copy" on the wrapper, to some public person, or to some private person of your acquaintance, whom, in your opinion, the article will interest, arouse, anger, or influence. Now that the subscription price of Liberty is so low, there are a number of its readers who could well afford to subscribe for two or three extra copies, using them in the manner just suggested. As a general thing, it is better to mark one article than more, especially if sure that it is of a character to command the addressee's attention. For instance, a copy of the present issue might be sent with advantage to so conspicuous an advocate of restriction of immigration as Henry Cabot Lodge; he probably would read with interest Mr. Byington's clever poem. Or so fair-minded and progressive a judge as Wm. L. Gaynor might see the force of Mr. Yarros's editorial on the predicament of the courts, and remember it when making some future decision. And perhaps my view of the arbitration treaty might be used or abused by Senator Daniel, on the one hand, or Senator Gray, on the other. Lawyers, doctors, editors, ministers, statesmen, professors,—in short, all men of influence, whether national or local, are good targets for such shots. Perhaps the best choice of all is a man already thinking in a line in which the chosen article is likely to lead him further.

The subversion of trial by jury is proceeding in this community with a quietness and a steadiness that are appalling. Under the special jury act passed by the legislature last year at the instance of that pliant tool of capital, Justice Barrett, the persons now filling the offices created by that act—a special jury commissioner and sundry subordinates—are now engaged in examining the citizens of New York in order to find among them a thousand men (I believe that is the number chosen to constitute the special panel) who have sufficient disregard for individual liberty and common justice to be willing to do the bidding of power in prosecutions so outrageous that the citizen of ordinary decency cannot be relied on to convict under them. I forget the precise conditions under which cases are to be turned over to twelve men drawn from this special panel, but, if I remember correctly, this matter is placed virtually at the option of the district attorney. The men who are placed on this panel are to be exempted from all other jury duty, which is practically a bribe offered to bankers and merchants (the men desired for the purpose) to tempt them to seek places on the panel, it being good policy for a business man to accept the risk of having to serve on perhaps one case every ten years in order to escape the frequent service (or fine) to which he is now subject. The object and effect of this special panel are to secure convictions under laws really obnoxious to the majority by sifting out a minority in sympathy with such laws from which alone to draw jurors for the trial of men charged with their violation. This is a death-blow to the jury system, the main purpose of which, as exacted by the barons from King John, was the protection of the individual citizen against the tyranny of the government. Under this new act the jury is to become, instead of such protection, a mere tool for the enforcement of the government's tyrannical will. To be convinced of this it is necessary only to pass through, or fail to pass through, the sieve which the special jury commissioner and his subordinates are now manipulating in the Constable Building at the corner of Fifth avenue and Eighteenth street. There you are asked, not only in general terms whether you have a prejudice against any law of the State that would preclude you from finding a person guilty of violation of such law, but also in specific terms whether you have a prejudice, for instance, against the new age-of-consent law that would preclude you from adjudging guilty of rape a man who had associated sexually, by her consent and at her desire, with a girl under eighteen years of age. This and one or two other hypothetical cases are put to you, revealing clearly that the motive of the new jury act is to enable the district attorney to successfully enforce laws which the people do not wish enforced. Of course the men that hold the reins of power are not yet bold enough to ask you directly whether, in a case involving the issue between labor and capital, you would give a verdict in favor of capital, though this is the information that they most desire. In fact, they do not need to ask you this. The age-of-consent question, in connection with sundry general questions also put, makes a very good cat's-paw, and they are reasonably sure of the chestnuts which it pulls out of the fire. But not a word about this procedure is to be found in the public press. The longest step ever taken in this country in the direction of undermining individual liberty is now almost completed, and no sound of protest goes up on any hand. Were not the people of the State of New York either blind or spineless, nightly mass-meetings would give voice to the consuming wrath which this outrage ought to, but does not, occasion.

Liberty.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the erasing-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — PROUDHON.

☞ The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

Predicament of the Courts.

One cannot help pitying the courts in their futile and painful efforts to find some way of reconciling the economic contradictions which perplex and menace modern society. Anyone who follows judicial decisions and pronouncements in cases involving the questions of combination, restraint of trade and competition, blacklisting, etc., knows that they are vainly groping in the dark, and constantly falling into pits dug by those who obey more powerful commands than are represented by anachronistic laws and blundering statutes. To vary the metaphor, the poor courts are between the devil and the deep sea. There are the common-law restrictions upon monopolies and restraints of trade to observe, and there are, on the other hand, the irresistible tendencies of modern industry. Having no principle to guide them, their decisions are necessarily contradictory, illogical, and arbitrary. Some time since, the Indiana supreme court held that workmen may order a strike as a means of compelling an employer to discharge an obnoxious fellow-workman. It argued very rationally that men have the right to say under what conditions they are willing to work, and that, if a certain fellow-workman is for any reason offensive to them, they are entitled to refuse to work with him. But, since a strike is nothing more than a refusal to work, there is nothing wrong in "coercing" an employer, by means of a strike, to discharge an employee. True, the discharged employee was injured, the court admitted, but the injury is incidental to the assertion of an unquestioned right on the part of the other employees, and he has no grievance that the law can recognize. A few weeks ago a Canadian court rendered a similar decision in a parallel case, and doubtless many libertarians felicitated themselves on the evidence of progress exhibited by our courts, just as Liberty has congratulated Justice Holmes, of Massachusetts, on his progressive and logical view of picket service and boycotting.

Now examine the case just decided by the New York court of appeals, in which the same question is presented in a somewhat different form. Suit was brought by an employee of a Rochester brewery against an assembly of the Knights of Labor to recover damages for causing him loss of employment. The assembly had made a contract with the brewers' organization whereby the latter agreed not to employ for more than four weeks any man who would not become a member of the order. The plaintiff having refused to join the assembly, the brewer discharged him, while the assembly succeeded in preventing him from obtaining a position elsewhere in the city. The court of appeals decides that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, reasoning as follows:

> Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and, if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper, or to restrict, that freedom, and, through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization, and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions, and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. It would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities. It would, to use the language of Mr. Justice Barrett in People ex rel. Gill vs. Smith, "impoverish and crush a citizen for no reason connected in the slightest degree with the advancement of wages or the maintenance of the rate."

Let us look into these several propositions. In the first place, Justice Barrett's dictum that such contracts as the one in question are not connected in the slightest degree with the maintenance and advancement of wages is plainly incorrect. Unions are the means of maintaining wages, and anything essential to the integrity and prosperity of trades unions indirectly protects the rate of wages. Unions cannot maintain wages, unless they are strong and well-organized, and contracts with large employers against retaining non-union men in service may be one of the necessary methods of promoting effective organization. Judge Barrett, therefore, is superficial in assuming that such contracts as that with the Rochester brewer are not required by the main object of unionism—the advancement of wages.

Be this as it may, the relevant and important question is what difference the court has discovered between a strike to compel the discharge of a non-union workman and a contract avoiding disputes by preventing the employment, side by side, of union and non-union men. It is to be supposed that the court would share the view of the Indiana and Canada tribunals regarding the right of a workman or a body of workmen to refuse to work with an offensive fellow-employee. Dissent from this doctrine would imply that workmen may not strike except for reasons approved by courts and legislatures—which would mean industrial slavery. But, if the "coercion" of an employer into discharging an employee by means of a strike or the threat of a strike is permissible, how can it be wrong to prevent the necessity of strikes and friction by a contract of the kind indicated?

The result is exactly the same in both cases. Either method involves "coercion" of the employer; for how is he induced to enter into a restrictive contract, if not through the open or tacit threat of a refusal to work? And either method has the effect of depriving a workman of the "utmost freedom to pursue his lawful calling." Either method is an attempt "to coerce workingmen to become members of the organization" under the "penalty of the loss of position and of deprivation of employment." If a contract is illegal, how can a strike for the same purpose and having precisely the same effect be permissible?

It is strange (or rather, it is not strange at all) that that alleged organ of individualism, the shallow and sophistical "Evening Post" of Godkin and White, should cordially approve the New York decision, and hail it as the affirmation of the alleged right "to one's livelihood." The "Post" says that the doctrine of the court is deeply embedded in the constitution and in the common law, and that without it there would be no freedom for the individual. How about the freedom of the union men to prescribe the terms of their employment, to strike for any reason and for no reason at all, in the absence of any contract obligation? Would the "Post" prohibit the coercion of the non-union men by means of strikes? What an amount of liberty the individual would then possess!

Godkin, like the court, does not distinguish between empty phrases and scientific propositions. They use such terms and phrases as "coercion," right to livelihood, freedom to pursue one's calling, etc., without any understanding of their real meaning. Their floundering and blundering are due to the fact that they have no test of invasion. They see that a certain contract deprives a third person of employment, and they raise the cry of "coercion," forgetting to inquire what sort of coercion is used, and overlooking the fact that the inhibition of certain kinds of "coercion" would lead to industrial slavery. The question in all cases is what the method is which is resorted to to deprive a man of his livelihood. If union men "coerce" employers and non-union men by striking or threatening to strike, they do nothing to which individual freedom does not entitle them. They simply assert their own rightful freedom, and, if their rightful freedom conflicts, not with the equal freedom, but with the interests, of some one else, they are not responsible for the injury to that individual.

It is commendable in the courts and pseudo-individualist organs to assail monopoly and vindicate freedom, but they have so confused notions of these things that their advocacy is often fatal to that which they profess to love and encouraging to that which they affect to abhor. In the name of freedom they would abolish all freedom, and to escape monopoly they would render impossible the existence of contract, combination, and coöperation. Trusts are too powerful to fear their opposition, but labor organizations can be seriously injured by so absurd decisions as that in the Rochester case.

V. Y.

Arbitration a Union of Tyrants.

It is to be hoped that the arbitration treaty with Great Britain, now pending in the senate, may be defeated. International arbitration, on its face, is a very pretty thing, and war, both on its face and in reality, is a very dread-

ful thing. But there are worse things than war, and oppression is one of them; and international arbitration, in reality, is more likely to sustain oppression than it is to prevent war. It is powerless to accomplish the good that is expected of it, and it is full of capacity for the maintenance of evils with which few dream that it has any connection.

It may seem strange, at first blush, that Liberty, which places so high a value upon jury trial as a method of preserving the peace among individuals, should deprecate its adoption as a method of preserving the peace among nations, especially as the proposed international juries, though lacking the important requisite of unanimity in the verdict, would more nearly realize the true trial by jury than present jury practice does, in that they would be judges, not simply of the facts, but of the law, of the justice of the law, and of the penalty. Closer examination, however, shows that the cases are not parallel. There is a vital difference between them. In one case it is possible to get an impartial jury; in the other it is not. Suppose, for instance, a community consisting of a dozen large families, or clans, in every member of each of which the family spirit is strong. Suppose these families to have interests in a considerable degree antagonistic, each being jealous of the growth and strength of the others. If a dispute were to arise or an offence to be committed in such a community, would it be possible to impanel an impartial jury for the trial of the cause? Certainly not. Probably all, and surely most, of the men drawn as jurors would be incapacitated for the rendering of an honest verdict by the fact that their public interest in the preservation of the peace would be less than their private interest in the immediate welfare of themselves and their clansmen. The value of the jury system depends, first of all, upon the fact that, in a community consisting of hundreds and thousands and millions of people unacquainted with each other personally, it is always possible, and even easy, to impanel twelve jurymen so remote from the parties immediately involved that none of them will have anything to gain or lose directly by the victory of either, while all of them, as citizens liable to invasion, will have much to gain indirectly by the defeat and restraint of whichever of the two parties shall be proved the invader.

Now, the community of nations is precisely in the situation of the community of families just supposed, and therefore for the settlement of international disputes it is not easy—in fact, it is generally impossible—to agree on even one juryman, let alone twelve, whose clannish interest is not more or less involved in the outcome, tempting him to subordinate thereto justice and the public peace. The verdict of such a jury in a matter of great importance will not be accepted by the nation to which it is adverse, provided that nation be strong enough to fight.

International arbitration, then, is powerless to abolish war. War can be abolished only by obliterating frontiers and abolishing the State.

Meanwhile international arbitration can do much to cement the relations of robber governments and bring about a closer coöperation between them in the prosecution of their schemes of theft and oppression. Labor has reason to fear when thieves propose to come to terms. An international arbitration treaty will pave the way for international extradition treaties, and international immigration treaties, and international restrictions of all sorts, more stringent than any that now exist, gradually reducing the individuals of all nations to a state of helplessness and hopelessness that will make them submissive slaves forever. Nowhere do you find labor enthusiastic for international arbitration. It cannot explain its lack of enthusiasm; it cannot formulate the reasons why; but, acting as always from impulse and instinct, for once it is headed in the right direction. It sniffs the danger from afar.

The cry of the old International Working-People's Association was: "Workers of all countries, unite!" The oppressors seem to have taken the cue, and now, under cover of international arbitration, the watchword is circulating: "Tyrants of all countries, unite!" Let their victims take warning. T.

Upper-Class Bovarys.*

The daily history of contemporary morals seems to take satisfaction in contradicting those who, stopping up their ears and bandaging their eyes, persist in declaring that there is no feminine crisis, and that the singular disease which torments our contemporaries is an invention of authors and lecturers.

The women, nevertheless, are doing all that they can to warn us.

While those of the people and of the modest *bourgeoisie* meet in congresses, air their grievances and voice their desires in assemblies, books, and magazines, those of the upper class, the society women, the rich and the titled, are applying the pick to the old structure to the best of their ability. Each week brings its princely scandal, with so abundant a harvest of intimate details, so insolent a publicity, that the surprise which such a matter used to occasion has given place first to entertainment and then to acceptance as a matter of course. I know very honest women of the *bourgeoisie* who no longer are in the least astonished when a married woman runs away with a tzigane—provided she is a princess.

Upper-class Bovarys, who feed the purveyors of scandal without noticing or caring for the effect produced upon others, upon the humble, who barely manage to live in the uneventfulness of the poor family, in the melancholy round of rough and tiresome toil. These princesses do not suspect that they are the real revolutionists, and that every time that one of their number escapes from the Old House, slamming the door after her, the Old Conjugal House is shaken much more profoundly than by the clamors of the suffering insignificant or by the violent attacks of lower-class innovators.

Must we condemn them, without mercy? Is their case so bad that they can find no defender? Many so deem it. Rich, beautiful, free, they seem without excuse for not enduring even the light chain of marriage in a world which has treasures of indulgence for those who know how to combine observance of the proprieties with secret enjoyment of voluptuous delights. Emma Bovary excites pity by the frightful disproportion between her desires and her condition. The wife of a ridiculous petty *bourgeois*, dreaming of romantic love and princely luxury in a fifth-story apartment in Ternes, is a commonplace of book and stage. She is forgiven for her fall, which seems almost like an ascension.

But there is no pity for the upper-class Bovarys, and their downfall definitively degrades them in the eyes of the crowd.

On the ground of high morality? Not at all. What the crowd will not pardon is that, having luxury and money, they nevertheless fall. For the attractions of luxury and money are the only reasons which the crowd accepts in justification, or even in explanation, of violation of social conventions.

Let us make bold to say it: nothing seems to-day so disgusting to everybody as a woman who loses her head through love. They affect to view her case as one of grotesque hysteria, or else as one of debasing libertinism. George Sand, from the depths of the Elysian Fields where she undoubtedly promenades in her glorious serenity, has had a chance recently to see how her amorous adventures are viewed. They have been carefully classified, and to this other Tsigane of Pagello but little more consideration has been shown. Women of temperament must make up their minds; they will not get respectful treatment from the press in future. Their romance will be treated as an unclean thing.

Yet it is not so mad a wish, this wish of the upper-class Bovarys for something superior to their miserable happiness. Sad queens of cosmopolitan society, how easily I understand their desire, on a day when they are suffering from a nervous attack, to escape from the round of methodical pleasures and catalogued amusements in which they have lived for twenty years, exchanging the Grand Hotel of Rome for the Savoy of London, and then for some other "first-class hotel" on the Riviera, and then for the boasted yacht, with gloomy intervals of château life and the Paris racing-season. Know, O modest *bourgeoise* women, to whom a glimpse of sumptuous life often seems a heavenly dream, that one tires of nothing so quickly as the comforts of luxury, and that all society people, men and women alike, are as weary of their pleasures as you can be of your monotony and your immobility. The proof is to be seen in the fact that men and women in society seek simply to escape from themselves, to fly from intolerable solitude.

The men seek relief from their *ennui* in sports, which give the illusion of effort; in change of scene, which gives the illusion of progress; in amateur art, which gives the illusion of glory, but at bottom they know very well that glory, effort, progress, are forbidden to them, and that they only go through the forms of human activity, producing nothing whatever and profiting nobody whomsoever. And likewise the women are condemned to only go through the forms, to only speak the words, of love, in an environment where love is excluded from marriage, and replaced, outside of marriage, by that mild form of debauchery known as flirting.

It will be said:

"Why, on the contrary! These men and these women, who have no labor imposed upon them, who are not hampered by the demands of business or the lack of money, have plenty of

* Translated from "Le Journal" by the editor of Liberty.

time in which to divert themselves by love, without stepping outside the circle of their customary relations."

"Alas!" will answer the interested parties, "how mistaken you are! In the first place, we have lost faith in each other, and the idea of a love-passion in our society seems to us a laughable extravagance. Besides, the grand passion is exclusive, and desires solitude; we have not the right of solitude. Our *passionettes* must accommodate themselves to the exigencies of our cosmopolitan life, so full and so empty, but so inexorable in its periodicity."

It is the truth.

So from time to time a woman loses her head, and begins to love, outside society's ranks, a man whose principal merit consists precisely in the fact that he is not *in society*. It seems to the poor woman of fashion that, simply because he does not wear a frock coat, simply because he has an art or trade, this lover will be a *man*, and not the eternal copy of the gentleman elbowed in all the capitals of Europe, whom she knows, and who knows her, in advance. It seems to her that this "crossing" will give birth to passion, enthusiasm, or, at least, heart-occupation, relief from *ennui*. Once this idea has taken root in the brain of a woman accustomed to indulge all her caprices, what is there to retain her? The idea of duty? From her childhood she has heard it interpreted in the narrow sense of conventionality. The religious idea? She no longer knows, accustomed to living in all the countries of Europe and to associate indifferently with people of all faiths, to say nothing of those who have none,—she no longer knows whether she has a religious faith. The only obstacles, then, are loss or diminution of fortune, and social inconveniences,—loss of standing. To sacrifice such interests to a man, even an unworthy man, is perhaps absurd, but it is not base, though the sole motive be physical attraction. Let us not go too far in holding a woman responsible for the quality of her amorous preferences. It is not the man that she chooses, it is love. She was suffering in prison; she escapes with the companion that offers, especially favoring one who will certainly be her ally against the society that she quits. If she ran away with one of her own world, she would not consider it an escape.

To these women who escape let us show a little of that indulgence which should be accorded to every act of passion done in spite of social and financial interests. Loves as madly romantic as these show a romantic taste which is not too common, and is in no danger of becoming so. And the resultant scandals have at least the advantage of affording us precious data as to the conditions of woman's heart in cosmopolitan society. There are, then, some, and of the highest, who cry out: "Anything rather than stay here!" Thus they noisily discredit a society without morals, without ideal, without country. They teach the humble that rich life is sometimes the most intolerable of lives. In violently returning to the elementary laws of love, they proclaim a sort of religion, inferior, to be sure, but at any rate more noble than that of the dollar.

Like those birds whom instinct forces to quit their nest when the season is about to change, they too, in their way and without knowing it, are precursors.

MARCEL PRÉVOST.

The Use of the Ballot.

I invite readers of Liberty to revert to the November and December numbers, carefully read again the discussion between Mr. Yarros and myself on the nature of the ballot, examine then in the present issue his latest contribution to the discussion, and decide for themselves whether this last can be considered as anything but a piece of special pleading.

It is not my purpose to traverse his present rejoinder point by point. Its manifest weakness relieves me from that task, which would be a little wearisome. Two points only shall I touch upon: in the one case, to show the practical insignificance to which Mr. Yarros's contention is reduced; in the other, to show his evasion of my argument that use of the ballot in existing politics is invasive.

Let me quote first, then, from his article in the November number,—the article that gave rise to this discussion.

> Of course, abstention does not prevent the Anarchists from expressing sympathy with progressive politicians and making war upon the more objectionable type. They can applaud the effort to secure free trade without voting and working for free-trade candidates. But, my correspondent objects, suppose that it actually depended on a single vote, or on the vote of an Anarchistic group, whether a congressional majority favorable to a free-trade bill should be elected or not; suppose that they had it absolutely in their power to decide, by throwing their political influence on the right side, whether the country should have free banking or the perpetuation of the present financial system: what would you advise?

Is it not clearly evident here that Mr. Yarros meant his readers to understand him (or his correspondent) as positing a situation where one of the two political parties which mainly divide the country's vote had inserted in its platform, *along with* the usual *mélange* of invasive and non-invasive proposals, a libertarian plank of great importance to Anarchists? Did any reader dream that he had in mind a situation where exactly one-half of the voters in the country (barring himself) had specifically arrayed themselves in favor of one libertarian plank, leaving all others out of their platform and specifically pledging their candidates against all invasive measures whatsoever? Of course not. Had it been his intention to discuss so extraordinary a hypothesis, then, like the careful writer that he is (though he now pleads carelessness), he would have stated it explicitly. But now he finds himself under the necessity of thus emasculating his hypothesis in order to give any degree of plausibility to his defence. As a result, his contention, even if sound, is deprived of all significance, because no such situation as that which Mr. Yarros now sets up, *and no approach to such a situation*, ever arises in the national politics of the United States.

But Mr. Yarros finds that he cannot demonstrate the possibility, even under these much-modified conditions, of non-aggressive use of the ballot. Unable to meet my argument, he dodges it. The question which he discussed in his first article was the advisability of voting. In comment I suggested that, in deciding whether voting is advisable or not, due weight should be given to the fact that use of the ballot is aggression. He answered that circumstances are conceivable, even with the existing political system, under which voting would not be, of necessity, an aggressive act, and he proceeded to instance such circumstances. The advisability of voting thus passing entirely out of the discussion, at least temporarily, and the issue between Mr. Yarros and myself turning exclusively upon the aggressiveness of voting, I replied that, with the existing political system, no conditions could be named under which the salary of the successful candidate and the expenses of his election would not be paid by compulsory taxation,—an aggression in which the voter, by voting, would become a participant. And now the only rejoinder that Mr. Yarros makes to this is that, under the conditions named by him, his participation in voting would result in less invasion than would his abstention from voting. Which, of course, is a sudden and sharp turn back from the question of the aggressiveness of voting to the question of the advisability of voting,—in other words, a dodge indisputable. The aggressive quality of the act of voting depends not at all on the *quantity* of aggression involved in the act. If it involves any aggression at all, it is aggressive, and those committing it are aggressors, while those who refrain from committing it are not aggressors, even though the total aggression be greater because of their refraining. Mr. Yarros's answer shows very clearly that, as I have always claimed, it may be advisable, in exceptional cases, to aggress in order to more triumphantly and finally establish the policy of non-aggression, but it utterly fails to show that such aggression is not aggression.

As for Mr. Yarros's final paragraph, dealing with absolute and relative ethics, it is simply an interposition of a veil of verbiage between the truth and those who would see it. It is my doctrine of exceptional cases clothed in the circumlocutions of Evolutionary Ethics. It is an attempt to get the benefit of the doctrine of exceptional cases, and at the same time ignore the fact that this doctrine is fatal to moralism. Fortunate it is for Mr. Yarros that his reputation as a thinker and a writer rests on something stronger than his part in this discussion. Otherwise he would have to be regarded as a careless and disingenuous disputant.

T.

Liberty and the Ballot.

Referring to the discussion of the propriety of using the ballot in the interest of liberty, I must deny at the outset that, in my second article on the subject, there was any abandonment of the position taken in the first, or any attempt to shift my position with or without an "air of having done nothing of the sort." Mr. Tucker is perfectly correct in stating that the question which I undertook to discuss originally was whether, politics being in general what they are today, a particular occasion can arise when it would be advisable for those who strictly adhere to equal freedom and do not admit the theory of "exceptional cases" to participate in them without violation of principle. This was the question discussed, not only in the first article, but also in the second. There was no conscious or unconscious substitution or change of propositions.

In my first article I maintained that it would not be ethically improper to use the ballot for the purpose of furthering the cause of freedom. This proposition having been challenged by Mr. Tucker, and the charge having been made by him that it involved a recognition of the doctrine of exceptional cases, I pointed out in the rejoinder that, as the use of the ballot is not an aggression when resorted to for the

purpose of preventing aggression and extending the sphere of legitimate freedom, the charge of inconsistency and "making light of the invasive quality of the ballot" was unfounded and manifestly due to a misapprehension. In other words, my contention was (and is) that under present political conditions the use of the ballot is not always and necesssarily an aggression.

But, says Mr. Tucker, the parenthetical remark that the ballot "means aggression" is a direct and flat contradiction of this proposition. Substituting the word "aggression" for the phrase "use of the ballot" in my statement, he triumphantly represents me as saying that it would not be improper "to aggress for the purpose of furthering the cause of freedom." Were I bound to accept this form of the statement, Mr. Tucker's criticism would certainly be justified. But no one who has read my first article carefully will admit the fairness of Mr. Tucker's purely verbal point. My parenthetical remark, I am sorry to say, was loose, but the context removes all reasonable doubt as to its true meaning. What I intended to say was this,—that, although, generally speaking, the use of the ballot under present conditions involves participation in a policy based on and characterized by aggression, there are conceivable circumstances under which it would not be improper to use the ballot. Mr. Tucker should not have taken advantage of a lack of precision, of an unfortunate slip of the pen. To deny that the ballot to-day generally means aggression, that voting under democracy and majority rule is inconsonant with equal freedom, is a truism which requires no defence or elaboration. My only point was that it would not be aggression, in the strict sense of the term, for certain citizens to vote for certain measures under peculiar circumstances conceived and supposed for the sake of the argument.

I supposed that my vote would be decisive in favor of a libertarian measure. The question is not whether my hypothesis is probable or not. My conclusion must be judged in the light of my own premises, not in that of any other. I dealt with an imaginary situation, not with a real one. I supposed that my vote would decide the fate of a libertarian measure, and that, if I voted for a certain candidate, the measure would be certain of enactment. I asserted (and still assert) that it would not be improper or inconsistent—in other words, it would not be aggression—for me to use the ballot in that situation. The only new objection Mr. Tucker has advanced is that the man elected by me might vote for measures of an invasive character, and that, in any case, his salary would be paid out of a fund collected by compulsory taxation. Since, then, there would be invasion, my vote would make me an accomplice in such invasion, and I could be justly held responsible for the consequences.

To this argument I demur. The facts I admit, but the conclusion does not follow, in my judgment. I can only be responsible for what is done with my consent and authority, or as a consequence of my acts. If I vote for a man because I believe that his election would secure the passage of a libertarian measure, and with the distinct understanding that he will not use my grant of power for the enactment of any new aggressive legislation (this being clearly part of the hypothesis, since there would be very little sense or use in trying to secure one libertarian measure at the expense of a dozen invasive ones), I am distinctly entitled to hold myself entirely absolved from the consequences of his violation of trust.

Suppose A and B to be candidates, and that the only *new* issue is the abolition of the tax on State banks. Suppose that the election of A means the abolition of the tax, and that I vote for him. There being no other issues, he is not bound to vote for invasive legislation, and, if I explicitly instruct him against voting for any proposals emanating from reactionary sources, my whole duty to liberty is done. I am guilty of no invasion, for the abolition of the tax is a libertarian measure. I am not responsible for new invasive legislation, for my candidate is pledged not to vote for it, and a deliberate violation of his pledge cannot be foreseen or presumed. Wherein, then, have I offended against equal freedom?

To be sure, the salary of my successful candidate will be paid out of compulsory taxation, as will be the expenses of the election and of the work of congress. But would my failure to vote do more to undermine this fabric of invasion than my participation? So far as these phases of the matter are concerned, the consequences of A's election are exactly equal to those of B's election. The government goes on, whoever is elected. The only result of my vote is the repeal of the tax,—the success of a libertarian measure. If I fail to vote, we have the compulsory taxation and all other standing aggressions plus the retention of the bank tax. If I vote, we have, as the only result of my act, the abolition of the tax. Other things remain unchanged, except that any step libertyward necessarily strengthens the movement for equal liberty.

And here is where the important distinction between absolute and relative ethics, which seems to puzzle Mr. Tucker so greatly, is properly brought in. Under absolute ethics it would not be necessary for an Anarchist to recognize or identify himself, even indirectly, with an invasive institution. He could even decline to associate with those who, like Mr. Tucker, believe in invading only under exceptional and extraordinary conditions. But we do not live under equal freedom, and absolute ethics cannot be applied. We have to promote liberty in ways rendered possible by existing conditions, and, if we can make appreciable gains by using the ballot under certain circumstances, we are entitled to do so, although superficially such a course would seem to make us accomplices in aggression. By using the ballot we undoubtedly identify ourselves in a sense with present politics, but reflection and analysis show that there may be situations in which the use of the ballot does not mean aggression, but does mean enlargement of liberty. Absolute ethics enjoins us to boycott evil and avoid all contact and affiliation therewith, but relative ethics authorizes us to use the methods and appliances and agencies of our day, provided the result is a gain to liberty. I say *authorizes*, not enjoins, because, after all, the question is one of method simply, and, if we can do more by systematic abstention, there is no rational reason for any participation in politics. But it can never be scientifically determined what methods are best adapted to the end in view, and it is therefore essential to inquire into the ethical propriety of using the ballot in the interest of liberty. I have endeavored to show when the use of the ballot would not involve aggression or expose us to liability for approving existing aggression. V. Y.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, Stephen T. Byington, Belvidere, N. J.

☞ For the present the fortnightly supply of targets will be maintained by sending members a special monthly circular, alternating with the issue of Liberty.

Target, both sections.—The "Dakota Ruralist," Huron, S. D., said last summer:

If any of our readers are opposed to Socialism, if they will write us briefly, we will publish their communications without comment.

The "Ruralist" is the organ of the Socialist faction of the People's Party in South Dakota. Show that Anarchy will give us the good things that Socialists aim at, and why it is superior to the ideal of the Socialists or of any other school of reformers. Or, attack Socialism by showing the futility of looking for benefits from government. Stephen T. Byington.

An Indignant Solon.

To the Editor of Liberty:

A marked copy of Liberty, addressed to the "Speaker of the House of Representatives, Kansas Legislature," reached me recently. The article marked related to a bill introduced in the Kansas house of representatives making "emasculation the penalty for rape." In this article you attempt to hold Populists responsible for the bill, and refer to them as "utterly barbaric," "State Socialists," etc.

There would be just as much propriety for me to class you with pickpockets and thieves, and would show about as much judgement, just because there are such people in the city of New York, as does your screed against the Populists in classing them barbaric in character. Let me inform you that the bill refered to was introduced in the house of representatives by a Republican, and not by a Populist. The introducer is an attorney of considerable prominence in his party, and at one time held the important position of district judge. Whether his intention was to attempt to push the bill to a vote in the house is unknown to the writer; but of one thing I am very certain,—that there is no rule of parlamentary practice in the house of representatives of the Kansas legislature to prohibit a member from introducing a bill, while, on the contrary, they are under the order of business, invited to do so each day.

The Populist party has burdens enough to bear, and has more than its share of abuse heaped upon it, without persons who are not advised of the true state of affairs attempting to hold them responsible for the individual acts of members of the Republican party as well. It would have been well for you, liveing as you do in the centre of wealth, influence, and intelligence (?), to have informed yourself of the true condition of affairs before assailing with your bombast the entire legislature of the great State of Kansas.

I have the honor to subscribe myself,

Very respectfully,

W. D. Street,

Speaker of House of Representatives.

Oberlin, Kansas, March 30, 1897.

[Nowhere in my paragraph did I state that the objectionable bill was introduced by a Populist, and, had I known that it was introduced by a Republican, the knowledge would not have compelled me to write my paragraph differently. My criticism was based entirely upon the statement of the news despatches that the bill was likely to pass and that the governor had promised to sign it. Both legislature and governor being Populist, the Populists would become the responsible parties in case of the bill's passage, no matter what the political complexion of the author of the bill. And I hold further that the Populists, together with all the latter-day ultra-governmentalists, are largely responsible for the ultra-governmental tendencies now manifest in the older political parties. The success, in the west and south, of Populist freaks and hayseeds has led the politicians to believe that there is a vast public sentiment calling for freak and hayseed legislation, and consequently Republicans and Democrats are vieing with each other and with the Populists in the silliness and brutality of their legislative proposals. So, in spite of Speaker Street's protest, I have nothing to retract. And indeed I do not think it would be possible to bring into undeserved ridicule the "legislature of the great State of Kansas," after its election, as its presiding officer, of the writer of the foregoing letter, with its remarkable orthography and syntax.—Editor Liberty.]

To The Laggards.

I'll wake you and shake you
 Until you arise;
I'll prick you and kick you
 Until you despise
The hunch and the paunch
 And the tattered disguise
Of the weak and the sleek
 And the coiners of lies.

I'll lash you and thrash you
 With eloquent thongs;
I'll ring you and ding you
 With resonant gongs
Until with a will
 You throw off the weeds
Of the fled and the dead
 For the now living creeds.

Basil Dahl.

Latter-Day America.

[Suggested by the present movement for an educational test for the exclusion of immigrants; by the recent experience in which it was found that Armenian refugees, having been plundered by the Turkish government, were legally inadmissible to this country as paupers; and by the recollection of Bryant's ode to America:

O mother of a mighty race,
Yet lovely in thy youthful grace!
The elder dames, thy haughty peers,
Admire and hate thy blooming years;
With words of shame
And taunts of scorn they join thy name.

For on thy cheeks the glow is spread
That tints thy morning hills with red;
Thy step—the wild deer's rustling feet
Within thy woods are not more fleet;
Thy hopeful eye
Is bright as thine own sunny sky.

. . . .

There's freedom at thy gates, and rest
For earth's down-trodden and opprest,
A shelter for the hunted head,
For the starved laborer toil and bread.
Power, at thy bounds,
Stops, and calls back his baffled hounds.

O fair young mother! on thy brow
Shall sit a nobler grace than now.
Deep in the brightness of thy skies,
The thronging years in glory rise.
And, as they fleet,
Drop strength and riches at thy feet.

Thine eye, with every coming hour,
Shall brighten, and thy form shall tower;
And when thy sisters, elder born,
Would brand thy name with words of scorn,
Before thine eye
Upon their lips the taunt shall die.]

She's somewhat lost her youthful grace;
The cares of raising such a race
Have made it quite in vain to seek
The dancing step, the rosebud cheek,
And, past a doubt,
Have soured her temper out and out.

To-day our nervous, worried mother
Fnds all her children such a bother
She can't get time to keep them quiet
And dress them well, and for their diet
To make plum cake
Such as she knows the neighbors bake.

Yet she can more supplies command
Than any housewife in the land,
But in her inexperienced youth
She can't keep house, and that's the truth;
She bustles, frets,
Scolds, clatters, smashes, and forgets.

She has a refuge here for men,
Unless they're *too* down-trodden; then
She sends them back to that same shore
That made them ignorant or poor,
To stay there till
They *there* have gathered coin and skill.

Properly speaking, here she runs
A boarding-house for favorite sons
Who seem to have the cash to pay
Their bills; to those who come and say:
"We want a chance
To work out our deliverance;"

She answers: "Go and work it out
Where folks can bear to have about
Impoverished, untrained, hopeful man;
Find such a country, if you can;
But, if you can't,
Get off the earth; come here you shan't."

Stephen T. Byington.

Latineries.

[Jean Richepin in Le Journal.]

AGAINST A CERTAIN CRITIC.

Never hope to content the bilious Bavius Pincerna. He considers it his glory to be satisfied with nothing. However well you may do, he always has dreamed of something better. When some one praised in his presence the exploits of the divine Hercules in making fifty Egyptian virgins pregnant in a single night, our eunuch insinuated that not all of them gave birth to twins.

AGAINST A CERTAIN LAW.

Formerly the town-criers sold in the streets the cards of courtesans, giving their names, residences, and prices. No one was obliged to buy these cards or to profit by the information which they afforded. Since the law of Scossa Pudens prohibiting these free practices, the courtesans announce themselves on their cards as pursuing legitimate callings. The dissolute are not deceived thereby. But, on the other hand, the innocent, the strangers, the beardless boys, run a risk of being drawn into debauchery in spite of themselves, under pretext of learning the language of the Garamantes or of enjoying a hyperborean massage. Thus the sceptre borne by the law of Scossa Pudens, contrary to his intent, is no other than the sceptre of the god of Lampsacus. So true is it that this sceptre is made of a wood which, the more you cut it, the more it grows.

ON THE BAD SMELLS OF ROME.

Rome complains because Rome stinks; but, in order to complain because Rome stinks, Rome opens her mouth; and that is why, the more Rome complains because Rome stinks, the more Rome stinks.

State Socialistic Absurdity.

The editor of "Egoism," who would have been an admirable writer had he had a literary training, and whose writing, as it is, has nearly all the virtues save those which a literary training gives, makes the following strong criticism upon the San Francisco "Examiner," and, for that matter, upon the New York "Journal" also, the two papers being owned by the same man, pursuing the same policy, and containing to a considerable extent the same matter:

The State Socialistic feature of the San Francisco "Examiner" has recently become very prominent in its news department and aggressive in its editorial harangue. The paper maintains a Single Tax department edited by a prominent Single Taxer, and reports favorably all State Socialistic meetings and other demonstrations of the kind, while editorial support is unqualifiedly given all State Socialistic propositions. But all this is not done without characteristic daily paper heterogeneous muddling and contradictoriness. For instance, it vociferously clamors for government ownership railroads, statute reduced street car fares, and State monopolization generally for the implied purpose of providing the people with service at cost. Yet it publishes such examples of State management as that reprinted in the February number of this paper, and, to cap its absurdity, importunes a plea for higher wages for the letter-carriers of our government postal service!

But we have State service for the sake of getting it at cost; that is its only excuse, and what are you going to make cost? So long as efficient men can be found to fill the places, there certainly is no consistent reason in cost principle for proposing higher wages. The "Examiner," upon stating the carriers' wages and proposed raise, cites that the raise would make no more than a San Francisco policeman gets, and avers that "nobody will maintain that a policeman's duties require a higher type of intelligence and integrity than those of a letter-carrier." But the only argument in this is a deadly one against the big strutting daily's whole Collectivist blare. So far as comparison of the carriers' wages with that of policemen is concerned, there is nothing in it at all, for policemen's wages are no more determined by competition than carriers' are, and the carriers might as well have been compared with themselves. But the claim that no greater intelligence and integrity is required to carry a citizen his mail than to protect his life, rights, and property, is indeed a piece of scathing humor on the quality of protection the Collectivist principle furnishes us. Nothing could be more eloquent indictment of the non-competitive principle of Collectivist service than this matter of fact asseveration of degeneracy.

If protection of life and liberty were furnished under competition by companies depending upon the efficiency and justice of their service for patronage and a living, it would soon protrude whether a higher type of intelligence and integrity were necessary for police service than to find a house and leave a letter. If a company providing protection were responsible for every violation of equal liberty by themselves as well as those they set out to restrain, having their conduct judged in each case by a previously-unknown assize jury of citizens, it would become painfully evident whether a man with less judgment than a letter-carrier needs to exercise could be afforded. Where business reputation and livelihood depended upon efficiency instead of political wire-pulling, only the rare man combining great physical strength and activity with the quickest and deepest insight into motive and coolest judgment in emergency could be afforded, and his salary would compare with a letter-carrier's about like that of an able sea-captain's does with the pay of a cabin-boy. Such a policeman would have to have the strength and agility to do what he undertook, and the comprehension and quickness to decide meritoriously in a moment what the ordinary citizen would deliberate upon later, or no responsible institution could afford to keep him. That the present policeman needs be little more than a beef clotheshorse to carry about a uniform and bluff, irresponsively clubbing according to ritual or whim, as mood or perquisite may dictate, is due to the State's imperial monopolistic function as protector of liberty. There is nothing to measure against, nothing to spur the monopolized occupation to better service to get its pay, since it is the only hog in the wallow. If the policeman, as a branch of the State, blunders and overreaches, the judge, a branch of the same institution and partisanship, ignores it. Or, if the policeman lags in such duties as are recognized, there is no competing policeman on the beat to merit patronage away from his employers, and he may continue to lag until mass indignation presses his political pull. But what a commentary upon the proposition to extend more and more the citizen's welfare to this irresponsible monster who, without blushing, supplies us with abler drudgery service than that detailed for the protection of our lives and liberties!

This fatal implication; this eternal verity which, but for the resistance of mob indignation, would degenerate the race to the meanest barbarism,—does not, however, distract the ponderous reasoning of the great swaggering Politician Socialist daily the least bit; it goes right on proposing government ownership of railroads, gas, water-supply—anything supposed to be getting money from the public, except the newspapers, and particularly the "Examiner." But why not have the State run the "Examiner" also? It is certainly a very public institution, judging from its continual boast about its circulation, and must bring in a handsome revenue, which would save the people much in taxes, or in hard cash, if they could have the paper at cost. Besides, it could be shipped over the State owned railroads to its State owned patrons without being weighed or kept account of, and thus save the dear people so much expense in bookkeeping, which could be turned to gratifying the ambition of the administering officialdom in some new direction. Of course, the "Examiner's" owner might object to having a business turned over to public benefit, that he had by sagacious management and deep foresight built from a losing game to profit and monumental merit. He might cite years of expense, suspense, and labor in open competition, for which in open competition he should be allowed to reap the full harvest, if other people are allowed the results of their efforts. Besides, he could show that the "Examiner's" excellence of news service over all its contemporaries is due to individual enterprise in arranging and maintaining everywhere special correspondents with personal interest in getting news to headquarters in the quickest and best shape, instead of by the different speed and local bias characterizing the irksome duty-propelled service of the associated press upon which others depend for news. He could easily show how, under disinterested State-management, all this excellence would never have developed, and would not be extended after being taken from its developer, since set salary would alike be the reward of the utmost strain of ingenuity and skill, and service just barely evading dismissal by machine politics. But all this is true of every private enterprise the "Examiner" proposes to turn over to the Collectivity. They started in as open competition as the "Examiner's" owner, and spent their money and energy coping with risk and searching out the best way to make the enterprise go, and, like the "Examiner," managed to stay until population enough has gathered about them to make them, like that paper, prosperous and powerful. But

now, having its principal capital in its mob-inciting power, while the others have theirs in dollars, it proceeds, savage-like, to dispossess the others of their advantage by violence. Is there, then, no civiler way? Will these corporations that have been going along thus for years now spring some irremediable calamity, if not seized by a prompt and violent hand? Is the universal law of competition no longer potent to regulate, as in the past ages? Can it no longer be trusted? What new measure-staff of merit has the "Examiner," and how did it determine its selection?

If it be argued that these institutions have all the available capital, so that competing regulation cannot be inaugurated, then posits the inquiry how this became so; how came a few men to get all this capital, while the rest, quite as industrious and frugal, have none? Why cannot the others start even now and get capital with which to compete these subjugating institutions, either by similar plants or by substitution? There is still abundance of unused earth and plenty of willing skill to produce competing gas and water plants, as well as railroads. Why not, then, proceed in this regular, emulative, fair way to reduce enormous profits to the compensation that other service brings? Unfortunately the why not is too hard by. Unused earth is held out of use by law to tempt ransom from skill's direct necessity, while both used and unused earth is prohibited for the same purpose and by the same means from the credit service necessary to enable all skill to variate its product into capital and retain it. The first is accomplished by giving title to earth by parchment instead of occupancy and use; the second by placing a ten per cent. tax on all credit medium, except gold. This, being limited by nature, while the number and needs of men are almost unlimited, not only limits producing operations to the gold volume, thus leaving the surplus men out altogether, but necessarily creates a competition among those who get a chance at it at all, that makes them pay its owners all their product, except so much as keeps them alive while using it. And, sure enough, there is no available capital to compete these mammoth corporations, and there never can be so long as the credit function is monopolized by anything less than all classes of property. The accumulation of other property besides gold does not help the exchange and skill variating difficulty any, for it is not available, being prohibited, except as it pays tribute to the gold that would have done the business for someone else. So, every new house, instead of meaning so much credit base with which to compete this gold monopoly to the rate of remuneration that other producers get, means so much added opportunity to get more of the gold at large into its hands. And this is why skill cannot start now and produce capital with which to compete these corporations to common rate of pay, and it is how all the available capital came into the hands of a few men. So it should be plain enough by this time that this is due to credit monopoly by a single commodity, and that the way to remedy it is to allow all property the same freedom that gold has, thus not only providing credit enough to give the surplus men opportunity to produce, but all men to do so without turning their surplus earnings into the coffers of coin monopoly for a chance to earn their living, instead of begging it or perishing. But not even the batting of a hair in such a direction has anybody heard from the "Examiner." It has itself ever had convenient coin mines at its back, and the monopolies it is trying to suppress by violence are as likely to volunteer their hold as is the "Examiner" to propose and defend the remedy that goes to the root of the trouble. It is cheaper to fake away at State Socialism and come out at worst a ruler than to champion liberty and take chances at complete competition.

"Impurity" Receives Dramatic Sanction.

[G. Bernard Shaw in Saturday Review.]

"Nelson's Enchantress." A new play, in four acts, by Risden Home. Avenue Theatre, February 11, 1897.

I am beginning seriously to believe that woman is going to regenerate the world after all. Here is a dramatist, the daughter of an admiral who was midshipman to Hardy, who was captain to Nelson, who commited adultery with Lady Hamilton, who was notoriously a polyandrist. And what is her verdict on Lady Hamilton? Simply that what the conventional male dramatist would call her "impurity" was an entirely respectable, lovable, natural feature of her character, inseparably bound up with the qualities which made her the favorite friend of England's favorite hero. There is no apology made for this view, no consciousness betrayed at any point that there is, or ever was, a general assumption that it is an improper view. There you have your Emma Hart, in the first act the mistress of Greville, in the second repudiated by Greville and promptly transferring her affection to his uncle, in the third married to the uncle and falling in love with another man (a married man), and in the fourth living with this man during his wife's lifetime, and parting from him at his death with all the honors of a wife. There is no more question raised as to the propriety of it all than as to Imogen's virtue in repulsing Iachimo. An American poetess, Mrs. Charlotte Stetson Perkins [*sic*], has described, in biting little verses, how she met a Prejudice; reasoned with it, remonstrated with it, satirised it, ridiculed it, appealed to its feelings, exhausted every argument and every blandishment on it without moving it an inch; and finally "just walked through it." A better practical instance of this could hardly be found than "Nelson's Enchantress." Ibsen argues with our prejudices—makes them, in fact, the subject of his plays. Result: we almost tear him to pieces, and shut our theatre doors as tight as we can against him. "Risden Home" walks through our prejudices straight on to the stage; and nobody dares even whisper that Emma is not an edifying example for the young girl of fifteen. Only, in the house of commons a solitary admiral wants the license of the theatre withdrawn for its presumption in touching on the morals of the quarter-deck. What does this simple salt suppose would have happened to the theatre, if it had told the whole truth on the subject?

In order to realize what a terrible person the New Woman is, it is necessary to compare "Nelson's Enchantress" with that ruthlessly orthodox book, "The Heavenly Twins." It is true that Madame Sarah Grand, though a New Woman, will connive at no triflings with "purity" in its sense of monogamy. But mark the consequences. She will tolerate no Emma Harts; but she will tolerate no Nelson either. She says, in effect: "Granted, gentlemen, that we are to come to you untouched and unspotted, to whom, pray, are we to bring our purity? To what the streets have left of *your* purity, perhaps? No, thank you: if we are to be certified pure, you shall be so certified too; wholesome husbands are as important to us as wholesome wives are to you." We all remember the frantic fury of the men, their savage denunciations of Madame Sarah Grand, and the instant and huge success of her book. There was only one possible defence against it; and that was to boldly deny that there was anything unwholesome in the incontinences of men—nay, to appeal to the popular instinct in defence of the virility, the good-heartedness, and the lovable humanity of Tom Jones. Alas for male hypocrisy! No sooner has the expected popular response come than another New Woman promptly assumes that what is lovable in Tom Jones is lovable in Sophia Western also, and presents us with an ultra-sympathetic Enchantress heroine who is an arrant libertine. The dilemma is a pretty one. For my part, I am a man; and Madame Grand's solution fills me with dismay. What I should like, of course, would be the maintenance of two distinct classes of women, the one polyandrous and disreputable and the other monogamous and reputable. I could then have my fill of polygamy among the polyandrous ones with the certainty that I could hand them over to the police if they annoyed me after I had become tired of them, at which date I could marry one of the monogamous ones and live happily ever afterwards. But, if a woman were to say such a thing as this about men, I should be shocked; and of late years it has begun to dawn on me that perhaps, when men say it (or, worse still, act on it without confessing to it), women may be disgusted. Now, it is a very serious thing for Man to be an object of disgust to Woman, on whom from his cradle to his grave he is as dependent as a child on its nurse. I would cheerfully accept the unpopularity of Guy Fawkes, if the only alternative were to be generally suspected by women of nasty ideas about them; consequently I am forced to reconsider my position. If I must choose between accepting for myself the asceticism which I have hitherto light heartedly demanded from all respectable women, and extending my full respect and tolerance to women who live as freely as "Nelson's Enchantress," why then—but space presses, and this is not dramatic criticism. To business!

It is a pity that the Nelson of the play is a mere wax work Nelson. The real man would have been an extraordinarily interesting hero. Nelson was no nice, cultured gentleman. He started sailoring and living on a scorbutic diet of "salt horse" at twelve; was senior officer of an expedition and captain of a 44 gun ship when he was twenty-two; and was admiral in command of a fleet in one of the greatest naval engagements of modern times when he was forty. Could any character-actor hit off the amphibiousness of such a person, and yet present to us also the inveteratey theatrical hero who ordered his engagements like an actor-manager, made his signals to the whole British public, and wrote prayers for publication in the style of "The Sign of the Cross" instead of offering them up to the god of battles. With consummate professional skill founded on an apprenticeship that began in his childhood, having officers to match and hardy and able crews, and fighting against comparative amateurs at a time when the average French physique had been driven far below the average English one by the age of starvation that led to the burning of the châteaux and the Revolution, he solemnly devoted himself to destruction in every engagement, as if he were leading a forlorn hope, and won not only on the odds, but on the boldest presumption on the odds. When he was victorious, he insisted on the fullest measure of glory, and would bear malice if the paltriest detail of his honors—the Mansion House dinner, for example—were omitted. When he was beaten, which usually happened promptly enough when he made a shore attack, he denied it, and raged like a schoolboy, vowing what he would do to his adversary the next time he caught him. He always played even his most heroic antagonists off the stage. At the battle of the Nile, Brueys, the French admiral, hopelessly outmanoeuvred and outfought, refused to strike his colors, and fought until the sea swallowed him and his defeat. Nothing could be more heroic. Nelson, on the other hand, was knocked silly, and remained more or less so for about three years, disobeying orders and luxuriating with Lady Hamilton, to the scandal of Europe. And yet who in England ever mentions the brave Brueys or that nasty knock on the head? As to Nelson's private conduct, he, sailor like, married a widow on a foreign station; pensioned her off handsomely when she objected to his putting another woman in her place; and finally set up a *ménage à trois* with Sir William and Lady Hamilton, the two men being deeply attached to one another and to the lady, and the lady polyandrously attached to both of them. The only child of this "group marriage" was Nelson's, and not the lawful husband's. Pray, what would you say, pious reader, if this were the story of the hero of an Ibsen play instead of the perfectly well known, and carefully never told, story of England's pet hero?

"Risden Home," I regret to say, does not rise to the occasion. Though she deals with Lady Hamilton like a New Woman, she deals with Nelson like a Married one, taking good care that she shall not set a bad example to husbands. She first gives us a momentary glimpse of Captain Horatio Nelson as an interesting and elegant young man, who could not possibly have ever suffered from scurvy. She introduces him again as Admiral Nelson immediately after the battle of the Nile, with two eyes and an undamaged scalp. Lady Hamilton does not make a scene by crying "O my God!" and fainting on his breast. On the contrary, in a recklessly unhistorical conversation, they both confess their love and part for ever, to the entire satisfaction of the moral instincts of the British public. Everything having thus been done in proper form, Nelson is made duke of Bronte for the Nile victory instead of for hanging Carracciolo; the remainder of Sir William Hamilton's lifetime is tactfully passed over; the existence of Lady Nelson and little Horatia is politely ignored; and Nelson is not reintroduced until his brief stay at Merton on the eve of Trafalgar. The fact that he has only just returned from spending two years very contentedly on board ship away from his Enchantress is not insisted on. He recites his

Wilson-Barrettian prayer; parts from the heartbroken Emma; and is presently seen by her in a vision, dying in the cockpit of the "Victory," and—considerate to the last of the interests of morality in the theatre—discreetly omitting his recommendation of his illegitimate daughter to his country's care.

Need I add, as to Emma herself, that we are spared all evidence of the fact that Greville only allowed her £20 a year to dress and pay her personal expenses; of her change from a sylph to a Fat Lady before the Nile episode; and of the incorrigible *cabotinage* which inspired her first meeting with Nelson, her *poses plastiques*, and her habit, after Nelson's death, of going to concerts and fainting publicly whenever Braham was announced to sing "'Twas in Trafalgar's Bay." In short, the Emma of the play is an altogether imaginary person historically, but a real person humanly; whereas the Nelson, equally remote from history, is a pure heroic convention. It still remains true that the British public is incapable of admiring a real great man, and insists on having in his place the foolish image they suppose a great man to be.

Under such restrictions no author can be genuinely dramatic. "Risden Home" has had no chance, except in the Greville episode in the first act; and this is of quite extraordinary merit, as plays go nowadays. Greville is drawn as only a woman could draw him. Although the character sketches certainly lack the vividness, and the dialogue lacks the force and the independence of literary forms and conventions, which a more experienced hand could have given them, yet they are several knots ahead of average contemporary dramatic fiction. The literary power displayed is, after Mr. Wilson Barrett and Miss Corelli, positively classical; and the author has plenty of scenic instinct. We have probably not heard the last of "Risden Home."